Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions
Subsection 485(1) and 949(1) of the
Bank Act (BA) and subsection 473(1) of the
Trust and Loan Companies Act (TLCA) require banks, bank holding companies and trust and loan companies, respectively, to maintain adequate and appropriate forms of liquidity.
The LAR Guideline is not made pursuant to subsection 485(2) or 949(2) of the BA or subsection 473(2) of the TLCA. However, the liquidity metrics set out in this guideline provide the framework within which the Superintendent assesses whether a bank, a bank holding company or a trust and loan company maintains adequate liquidity pursuant to the Acts. For this purpose, the Superintendent has established two minimum standards: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). These standards – in conjunction with additional liquidity metrics where OSFI reserves the right to apply supervisory requirements as needed, including the net cumulative cash flow (NCCF), the operating cash flow statement (OCFS), the liquidity monitoring tools and the intraday liquidity monitoring tools – when assessed as a package, provide an overall perspective of the liquidity adequacy of an institution. The LAR Guideline should be read together with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's (BCBS)
Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision and OSFI's Guideline B-6:
Liquidity Principles. As such, OSFI will conduct detailed supervisory assessments of both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of an institution's liquidity risk, as presented in the LAR Guideline and Guideline B-6, respectively. Notwithstanding that a bank, a bank holding company or a trust and loan company may meet the aforementioned standards, the Superintendent may by order direct a bank or bank holding company to take actions to improve its liquidity under subsection 485(3) or 949(3), respectively, of the BA or a trust and loan company to take actions to improve its liquidity under subsection 473(3) of the TLCA.
OSFI, as a member of the BCBS, participated in the development of the international liquidity framework, including
Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (January 2013),
Basel III: the Net Stable Funding Ratio (October 2014) and
Monitoring tools for intraday liquidity management (April 2013). This domestic guidance is based on the Basel III framework, supplemented to include additional OSFI-designed measures to assess the liquidity adequacy of an institution.
Where relevant, the Basel III paragraph numbers are provided in square brackets at the end of each paragraph referencing material from the Basel III framework. Some chapters include boxed-in text (called OSFI Notes) that set out how certain requirements are to be implemented by Canadian banks, bank holding companies, and trust and loan companies, collectively referred to as 'institutions'.
The Liquidity Adequacy Requirements (LAR) for banks, bank holding companies and trust and loan companies are set out in seven chapters, each of which has been issued as a separate document. This document, which contains Chapter 7 – Intraday Liquidity Monitoring Tools, should be read together with the other LAR chapters which include:
This chapter is drawn from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's (BCBS)
Monitoring tools for intraday liquidity management (April 2013). For reference, the Basel text paragraph numbers that are associated with the text appearing in this chapter are indicated in square brackets at the end of each paragraphFootnote 1.
Management of intraday liquidity risk forms a key element of an institution's overall liquidity risk management framework as outlined in BCBS
Sound PrinciplesFootnote 2 and OSFI's
Guideline B-6: Liquidity PrinciplesFootnote 3.
Specifically, Principle 8 of the
Sound Principles and Principle 12 of OSFI's
Guideline B-6:Liquidity Principles state that "a bank should actively manage its intraday liquidity positions and risks to meet payment and settlement obligations on a timely basis under both normal and stressed conditions and thus contribute to the smooth functioning of payment and settlement systems." Moreover, six operational elements that should be included in a bank's strategy for managing intraday liquidity risk are identified:
[BCBS April 2013, para 1 and para 2]
The BCBS, in consultation with the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSSFootnote 4), has developed a set of quantitative tools to enable supervisors to monitor institutions' intraday liquidity risk and their ability to meet payment and settlement obligations on a timely basis under both normal and stressed conditions. The monitoring tools will complement the qualitative guidance in the BCBS
Sound Principles and OSFI's
Guideline B-6:Liquidity Principles. [BCBS April 2013, para 4]
Given the close relationship between the management of institutions' intraday liquidity risk and the smooth functioning of payment and settlement systemsFootnote 5, the tools will also be of benefit to central bank or other authorities responsible for the oversight of payment and settlement systems (overseers). It is envisaged that the introduction of monitoring tools for intraday liquidity will lead to closer co-operation between banking supervisors and the overseers in the monitoring of banks' payment behaviour. [BCBS April 2013, para 5]
It is important to note that the tools are being introduced for monitoring purposes only. Internationally active institutions will be required to apply these tools. These tools may also be useful in promoting sound liquidity management practices for other institutions, whether they are direct participantsFootnote 6 of a large-value payment system (LVPS)Footnote 7 or use a correspondent bank to settle payments. National supervisors will determine the extent to which the tools apply to non-internationally active banks within their jurisdictions. [BCBS April 2013, para 6]
Consistent with their broader liquidity risk management responsibilities, institution management will be responsible for collating and submitting the monitoring data for the tools to their supervisor.Footnote 8 It is recognised that institutions may need to liaise closely with counterparts, including payment system operators and correspondent banks, to collate these data. However, institutions and supervisors are not required to disclose these reporting requirements publicly. Public disclosure is not intended to be part of these monitoring tools. [BCBS April 2013, para 7]
OSFI, as supervisor of the institutions subject to the Liquidity Adequacy Requirements Guideline, and the Bank of Canada, as overseers of the Canadian payment and settlement system, will, collectively, be responsible for administering the package of intraday liquidity monitoring tools. Per footnote 8, discussions between the agencies will occur, in due course, related to which specific intraday monitoring tools will be collected and utilized by each agency. Until such time as additional clarity is brought forward, all references to the term 'supervisors' from this paragraph on in this chapter should be read to mean OSFI and the Bank of Canada.
For the purpose of this chapter, the following definitions will apply to the terms stated below:
The following sets out the main constituent elements of an institution's intraday liquidity sources and usage.Footnote 10 (The list should not be taken as exhaustive.)
In correspondent banking, some customer payments are made across accounts held by the same correspondent bank. These payments do not give rise to an intraday liquidity source or usage for the correspondent bank as they do not link to the payment and settlement systems. However, these 'internalised payments' do have intraday liquidity implications for both the sending and receiving customer institutions and should be incorporated in their reporting of the monitoring tools. [BCBS April 2013, para 11]
At this point in time, OSFI will not require institutions to provide intraday liquidity monitoring tools via regulatory reporting. OSFI and the Bank of Canada will continue to review the applicable implementation date for these metrics and will discuss the proposed timing of rollout with institutions in advance of taking a final decision.
Once implemented, the intraday liquidity monitoring tools outlined hereinafter will only apply to OSFI-regulated institutions that are direct clearers (both Domestic Systemically Important Banks (DSIBs) and small and medium sized deposit-taking institutions (SMSBs).
A number of factors influence an institution's usage of intraday liquidity in payment and settlement systems and its vulnerability to intraday liquidity shocks. As such, no single monitoring tool can provide supervisors with sufficient information to identify and monitor the intraday liquidity risk run by an institution. To achieve this, seven separate monitoring tools have been developed (see Table 1). As not all of the tools will be relevant to all reporting institutions, the tools have been classified in three groups to determine their applicability as follows:
This tool will enable supervisors to monitor an institution's intraday liquidity usage in normal conditions. It will require institutions to monitor the net balance of all payments made and received during the day over their settlement account, either with the central bank (if a direct participant) or over their account held with a correspondent bank (or accounts, if more than one correspondent bank is used to settle payments). The largest net negative position during the business day on the account(s), (i.e. the largest net cumulative balance between payments made and received), will determine an institution's maximum daily intraday liquidity usage. The net position should be determined by settlement time stamps (or the equivalent) using transaction-by-transaction data over the account(s). The largest net negative balance on the account(s) can be calculated after close of the business day and does not require real-time monitoring throughout the day. [BCBS April 2013, para 13]
For illustrative purposes only, the calculation of the tool is shown in Figure 1. A positive net position signifies that the institution has received more payments than it has made during the day. Conversely, a negative net position signifies that the institution has made more payments than it has received.Footnote 14 For direct participants, the net position represents the change in its opening balance with the central bank. For institutions that use one or more correspondent banks, the net position represents the change in the opening balance on the account(s) with its correspondent bank(s). [BCBS April 2013, para 14]
Figure 1: Net Cumulative Position over Time
This line chart illustrates an institution's intraday liquidity usage. The X axis represents the timeline between start of the business day and end of the business day. The Y axis represent the net cumulative position from which the largest positive and negative positions can be observed. Beginning of day position should be zero and subsequently fluctuate according to the net payments made or received.
Assuming that an institution runs a negative net position at some point intraday, it will need access to intraday liquidity to fund this balance. The minimum amount of intraday liquidity that an institution would need to have available on any given day would be equivalent to its largest negative net position. (In the illustration above, the intraday liquidity usage would be 10 units.) [BCBS April 2013, para 15]
Conversely, when an institution runs a positive net cumulative position at some point intraday, it has surplus liquidity available to meet its intraday liquidity obligations. This position may arise because the institution is relying on payments received from other LVPS participants to fund its outgoing payments. (In the illustration above, the largest positive net cumulative position would be 8.6 units.) [BCBS April 2013, para 16]
Institutions should report their three largest daily negative net cumulative positions on their settlement or correspondent account(s) in the reporting period and the daily average of the negative net cumulative position over the period. The largest positive net cumulative positions, and the daily average of the positive net cumulative positions, should also be reported. As the reporting data accumulates, supervisors will gain an indication of the daily intraday liquidity usage of an institution in normal conditions. [BCBS April 2013, para 17]
This tool will enable supervisors to monitor the amount of intraday liquidity an institution has available at the start of each day to meet its intraday liquidity requirements in normal conditions. Institutions should report both the three smallest sums by value of intraday liquidity available at the start of each business day in the reporting period, and the average amount of available intraday liquidity at the start of each business day in the reporting period. The report should also break down the constituent elements of the liquidity sources available to the institution. [BCBS April 2013, para 18]
Drawing on the liquidity sources set out in Section 7.1.B, institutions should discuss and agree with their supervisor the sources of liquidity which they should include in the calculation of this tool. Where institutions manage collateral on a cross-currency and/or cross-system basis, liquidity sources not denominated in the currency of the intraday liquidity usage and/or which are located in a different jurisdiction, may be included in the calculation if the institution can demonstrate to the satisfaction of its supervisor that the collateral can be transferred intraday freely to the system where it is needed. [BCBS April 2013, para 19]
As the reporting data accumulates, supervisors will gain an indication of the amount of intraday liquidity available to an institution to meet its payment and settlement obligations in normal conditions. [BCBS April 2013, para 20]
This tool will enable supervisors to monitor the overall scale of an institution's payment activity. For each business day in a reporting period, institutions should calculate the total of their gross payments sent and received in the LVPS and/or, where appropriate, across any account(s) held with a correspondent bank(s). Institutions should report the three largest daily values for gross payments sent and received in the reporting period and the average daily figure of gross payments made and received in the reporting period. [BCBS April 2013, para 21]
This tool will enable supervisors to gain a better understanding of an institution's time specific obligations.Footnote 15 Failure to settle such obligations on time could result in financial penalty, reputational damage to the institution or loss of future business. [BCBS April 2013, para 22]
Institutions should calculate the total value of time-specific obligations that they settle each day and report the three largest daily total values and the average daily total value in the reporting period to give supervisors an indication of the scale of these obligations. [BCBS April 2013, para 23]
This tool will enable supervisors to gain a better understanding of the proportion of a correspondent bank's payment flows that arise from its provision of correspondent banking services. These flows may have a significant impact on the correspondent bank's own intraday liquidity management.Footnote 17 [BCBS April 2013, para 24]
Correspondent banks should calculate the total value of payments they make on behalf of all customers of their correspondent banking services each day and report the three largest daily total values and the daily average total value of these payments in the reporting period. [BCBS April 2013, para 25]
(ii) Intraday credit lines extended to customersFootnote 18
This tool will enable supervisors to monitor the scale of a correspondent bank's provision of intraday credit to its customers. Correspondent banks should report the three largest intraday credit lines extended to their customers in the reporting period, including whether these lines are secured or committed and the use of those lines at peak usage.Footnote 19 [BCBS April 2013, para 26]
This tool will enable supervisors to monitor the throughput of a direct participant's daily payments activity across its settlement account. Direct participants should report the daily average in the reporting period of the percentage of their outgoing payments (relative to total payments) that settle by specific times during the day, by value within each hour of the business day.Footnote 20 Over time, this will enable supervisors to identify any changes in an institution's payment and settlement behaviour. [BCBS April 2013, para 27]
The monitoring tools in Section 7.2 will provide supervisors with information on an institution's intraday liquidity profile in normal conditions. However, the availability and usage of intraday liquidity can change markedly in times of stress. In the course of their discussions on broader liquidity risk management, institutions and supervisors should also consider the impact of an institution's intraday liquidity requirements in stress conditions. As guidance, four possible (but non-exhaustive) stress scenarios have been identified and are described below.Footnote 21 Institutions should determine with their supervisor which of the scenarios are relevant to their particular circumstances and business model. [BCBS April 2013, para 28]
Institutions need not report the impact of the stress scenarios on the monitoring tools to supervisors on a regular basis. They should use the scenarios to assess how their intraday liquidity profile in normal conditions would change in conditions of stress and discuss with their supervisor how any adverse impact would be addressed either through contingency planning arrangements and/or their wider intraday liquidity risk management framework. [BCBS April 2013, para 29]
For a direct participant, own financial and/or operational stress may result in counterparties deferring payments and/or withdrawing intraday credit lines. This, in turn, may result in the institution having to fund more of its payments from its own intraday liquidity sources to avoid having to defer its own payments. [BCBS April 2013, para 30]
For institutions that use correspondent banking services, an own financial stress may result in intraday credit lines being withdrawn by the correspondent bank(s), and/or its own counterparties deferring payments. This may require the institution having either to prefund its payments and/or to collateralise its intraday credit line(s). [BCBS April 2013, para 31]
A counterparty stress may result in direct participants and institutions that use correspondent banking services being unable to rely on incoming payments from the stressed counterparty, reducing the availability of intraday liquidity that can be sourced from the receipt of the counterparty's payments. [BCBS April 2013, para 32]
A customer bank's stress may result in other institutions deferring payments to the customer, creating a further loss of intraday liquidity at its correspondent bank. [BCBS April 2013, para 33]
A market-wide credit or liquidity stress may have adverse implications for the value of liquid assets that an institution holds to meet its intraday liquidity usage. A widespread fall in the market value and/or credit rating of an institution's unencumbered liquid assets may constrain its ability to raise intraday liquidity from the central bank. In a worst case scenario, a material credit downgrade of the assets may result in the assets no longer meeting the eligibility criteria for the central bank's intraday liquidity facilities. [BCBS April 2013, para 34]
For an institution that uses correspondent banking services, a widespread fall in the market value and/or credit rating of its unencumbered liquid assets may constrain its ability to raise intraday liquidity from its correspondent bank(s). [BCBS April 2013, para 35]
Institutions which manage intraday liquidity on a cross-currency basis should consider the intraday liquidity implications of a closure of, or operational difficulties in, currency swap markets and stresses occurring in multiple systems simultaneously. [BCBS April 2013, para 36]
own financial stress and
counterparty stress, all reporting institutions should consider the likely impact that these stress scenarios would have on their daily maximum intraday liquidity usage, available intraday liquidity at the start of the business day, total payments and time-specific obligations. [BCBS April 2013, para 37]
customer bank's stress scenario, institutions that provide correspondent banking services should consider the likely impact that this stress scenario would have on the value of payments made on behalf of its customers and intraday credit lines extended to its customers. [BCBS April 2013, para 38]
market-wide stress, all reporting institutions should consider the likely impact that the stress would have on their sources of available intraday liquidity at the start of the business day. [BCBS April 2013, para 39]
While each of the monitoring tools has value in itself, combining the information provided by the tools will give supervisors a comprehensive view of an institution's resilience to intraday liquidity shocks. Examples on how the tools could be used in different combinations by supervisors to assess an institution's resilience to intraday liquidity risk are presented in Annex 2. [BCBS April 2013, para 40]
Institutions generally manage their intraday liquidity risk on a system-by-system basis in a single currency, but it is recognised that practices differ across institutions and jurisdictions, depending on the institutional set up of an institution and the specifics of the systems in which it operates. The following considerations aim to help institutions and supervisors determine the most appropriate way to apply the tools. Should institutions need further clarification, they should discuss the scope of application with their supervisors. [BCBS April 2013, para 41]
Institutions which are direct participants to an LVPS can manage their intraday liquidity in very different ways. Some institutions manage their payment and settlement activity on a system-by-system basis. Others make use of direct intraday liquidity 'bridges'Footnote 22 between LVPS, which allow excess liquidity to be transferred from one system to another without restriction. Other formal arrangements exist, which allow funds to be transferred from one system to another (such as agreements for foreign currency liquidity to be used as collateral for domestic systems). [BCBS April 2013, para 42]
To allow for these different approaches, direct participants should apply a 'bottom-up' approach to determine the appropriate basis for reporting the monitoring tools. The following sets out the principles which such institutions should follow:
Ancillary systems (e.g. retail payment systems, CLS, some securities settlement systems and central counterparties), place demands on an institution's intraday liquidity when these systems settle the institution's obligations in an LVPS. Consequently, separate reporting requirements will not be necessary for such ancillary systems. [BCBS April 2013, para 44]
Institutions that use correspondent banking services should base their reports on the payment and settlement activity over their account(s) with their correspondent bank(s). Where more than one correspondent bank is used, the institution should report per correspondent bank. For institutions which access an LVPS indirectly through more than one correspondent bank, the reporting may be aggregated, provided that the reporting institution can demonstrate to the satisfaction of its supervisor that it is able to move liquidity between its correspondent banks. [BCBS April 2013, para 45]
Institutions which operate as direct participants of an LVPS but which also make use of correspondent banks should discuss whether they can aggregate these for reporting purposes with their supervisor. Aggregation may be appropriate if the payments made directly through the LVPS and those made through the correspondent bank(s) are in the same jurisdiction and same currency. [BCBS April 2013, para 46]
Institutions that manage their intraday liquidity on a currency-by-currency basis should report on an individual currency basis. [BCBS April 2013, para 47]
If an institution can prove to the satisfaction of its supervisor that it manages liquidity on a cross-currency basis and has the ability to transfer funds intraday with minimal delay – including in periods of acute stress – then the intraday liquidity positions across currencies may be aggregated for reporting purposes. However, institutions should also report at an individual currency level so that supervisors can monitor the extent to which firms are reliant on foreign exchange swap markets. [BCBS April 2013, para 48]
When the level of activity of an institution's payment and settlement activity in any one particular currency is considered de minimis with the agreement of the supervisorFootnote 23 a reporting exemption could apply and separate returns need not be submitted. [BCBS April 2013, para 49]
The appropriate organisational level for each institution's reporting of its intraday liquidity data should be determined by the supervisor, but it is expected that the monitoring tools will typically be applied at a significant individual legal entity level. The decision on the appropriate entity should consider any potential impediments to moving intraday liquidity between entities within a group, including the ability of supervisory jurisdictions to ring-fence liquid assets, timing differences and any logistical constraints on the movement of collateral. [BCBS April 2013, para 50]
Where there are no impediments or constraints to transferring intraday liquidity between two (or more) legal entities intraday, and institutions can demonstrate this to the satisfaction of their supervisor, the intraday liquidity requirements of the entities may be aggregated for reporting purposes. [BCBS April 2013, para 51]
For cross-border banking groups, where an institution operates in LVPS and/or with a correspondent bank(s) outside the jurisdiction where it is domiciled, both home and host supervisors will have an interest in ensuring that the institution has sufficient intraday liquidity to meet its obligations in the local LVPS and/or with its correspondent bank(s).Footnote 24 The allocation of responsibility between home and host supervisor will ultimately depend upon whether the institution operating in the non-domestic jurisdiction does so via a branch or a subsidiary.
For a branch operation
The home (consolidated) supervisor should have responsibility for monitoring through the collection and examination of data that its banking groups can meet their payment and settlement responsibilities in all countries and all currencies in which they operate. The home supervisor should therefore have the option to receive a full set of intraday liquidity information for its banking groups, covering both domestic and non-domestic payment and settlement obligations.
The host supervisor should have the option to require foreign branches in their jurisdiction to report intraday liquidity tools to them, subject to materiality.
For a subsidiary active in a non-domestic LVPS and/or correspondent bank(s)
The host supervisor should have primary responsible for receiving the relevant set of intraday liquidity data for that subsidiary.
The supervisor of the parent institution (the home consolidated supervisor) will have an interest in ensuring that a non-domestic subsidiary has sufficient intraday liquidity to participate in all payment and settlement obligations. The home supervisor should therefore have the option to require non-domestic subsidiaries to report intraday liquidity data to them as appropriate. [BCBS April 2013, para 52]
The following example illustrates how the tools would operate for an institution on a particular business day. Assume that on the given day, the institution's payment profile and liquidity usage is as follows:
Details of the institution's payment profile are as followings:
[BCBS April 2013, Annex 1]
The following is a non-exhaustive set of examples which illustrate how the tools could be used in different combinations by supervisors to assess an institution's resilience to intraday liquidity risk:
If a high proportion of an institution's payment activity is time critical, the institution has less flexibility to deal with unexpected shocks by managing its payment flows, especially when its amount of available intraday liquidity at the start of the business day is typically low. In such circumstances the supervisor might expect the institution to have adequate risk management arrangements in place or to hold a higher proportion of unencumbered assets to mitigate this risk.
If the impact of an intraday liquidity stress on an institution's daily liquidity usage is large relative to its available intraday liquidity at the start of the business day, it suggests that the institution may struggle to settle payments in a timely manner in conditions of stress.
If an institution misses its time-specific obligations, it could have a significant impact on other institutions. If it were demonstrated that the institution's daily liquidity usage was high and the lowest amount of available intraday liquidity at the start of the business day were close to zero, it might suggest that the institution is managing its payment flows with an insufficient pool of liquid assets.
If a large proportion of an institution's total payment activity is made by a correspondent bank on behalf of its customers and, depending on the type of the credit lines extended, the correspondent bank could be more vulnerable to a stress experienced by a customer. The supervisor may wish to understand how this risk is being mitigated by the correspondent bank.
If an institution starts to defer its payments and this coincides with a reduction in its liquidity usage (as measured by its largest positive net cumulative position), the supervisor may wish to establish whether the institution has taken a strategic decision to delay payments to reduce its usage of intraday liquidity. This behavioural change might also be of interest to the overseers given the potential knock-on implications to other participants in the LVPS. [BCBS April 2013, Annex 3]
Following the format: [BCBS April 2013, para x].
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The CPSS serves as a forum for central banks to monitor and analyse developments in payment and settlement arrangements as well as in cross-border and multicurrency settlement schemes. It consists of senior officials responsible for payment and settlement systems in central banks.
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Where reference is made in this paper to payment and settlement systems, the term is understood to encompass payment systems and clearing and settlement systems for securities and derivatives (including central counterparties).
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'Direct participant' means a participant in a large-value payment system that can settle transactions without using an intermediary. If not a direct participant, a participant will need to use the services of a direct participant (a correspondent bank) to perform particular settlements on its behalf. Institutions can be a direct participant in a large-value payment system while using a correspondent bank to settle particular payments, for example, payments for an ancillary system.
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An LVPS is a funds transfer system that typically handles large-value and high-priority payments. In contrast to retail payment systems, many LVPSs are operated by central banks, using a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) or equivalent mechanism.
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As agreed by national authorities in a particular jurisdiction, the monitoring data may be collected by a relevant domestic oversight authority (e.g. payments system overseer) instead of the banking supervisor.
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A glossary of terms used in payments and settlements systems, March 2003.
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Not all elements will be relevant to all reporting institutions as intraday liquidity profiles will differ between institutions (e.g. whether they access payment and settlement systems directly or indirectly or whether they provide correspondent banking services and intraday credit facilities to other institutions, etc.).
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Ancillary systems include other payment systems such as retail payment systems, CLS, securities settlement systems and central counterparties.
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Although uncommitted credit lines can be withdrawn in times of stress (see stress scenario (i) in Section 6.3), such lines are an available source of intraday liquidity in normal times.
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Some securities settlement systems offer self-collateralisation facilities in co-operation with the central bank. Through these, participants can automatically post incoming securities from the settlement process as collateral at the central bank to obtain liquidity to fund their securities settlement systems' obligations. In these cases, intraday liquidity usages are only those related to the haircut applied by the central bank.
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For the calculation of the net cumulative position, "payments received" do not include funds obtained through central bank intraday liquidity facilities.
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These obligations include, for example, those for which there is a time-specific intraday deadline, those required to settle positions in other payment and settlement systems, those related to market activities (such as the delivery or return of money market transactions or margin payments), and other payments critical to an institution's business or reputation (see footnote 10 of the BCBS
Sound Principles). Examples include the settlement of obligations in ancillary systems, CLS pay-ins or the return of overnight loans. Payments made to meet the throughput guidelines are not considered time-specific obligations for the purpose of this tool.
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The term 'customers' includes all entities for which the correspondent bank provides correspondent banking services.
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Paragraph 79 of the BCBS
Sound Principles states that: "[T]he level of a bank's gross cash inflows and outflows may be uncertain, in part because those flows may reflect the activities of its customers, especially where the bank provides correspondent or custodian services."
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Not all elements will be relevant to all reporting institutions as intraday liquidity profiles will differ between institutions (e.g. whether they access payment and settlement systems directly or indirectly or whether they provide correspondent banking services and intraday credit facilities to other institutions, etc.)
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The figure to be reported for the three largest intraday credit lines extended to customers should include uncommitted and unsecured lines. This disclosure does not change the legal nature of these credit lines.
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It should be noted that some jurisdictions already have throughput rules or guidelines in place. For example, in the case of Canada's LVTS, Payments Canada recommends that LVTS participants abide by the following daily throughput guidelines: 25% of daily transaction value and 40% of daily transaction volume should be completed by 10:00 hours Eastern time (ET), 60% of both aggregate volume and value should be completed by 13:00 hours ET, and 80% of both aggregate volume and value should be completed by 16:30 hours ET. Note that, although these throughput guidelines are not mandatory at this time, Payments Canada reserves the right to make them mandatory if participants do not appear to be abiding by them.
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Institutions are encouraged to consider reverse stress scenarios and other stress testing scenarios as appropriate (for example, the impact of natural disasters, currency crisis, etc.). In addition, institutions should use these stress testing scenarios to inform their intraday liquidity risk tolerance and contingency funding plans.
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A direct intraday liquidity bridge is a technical functionality built into two or more LVPS that allows banks to make transfers directly from one system to the other intraday.
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As an indicative threshold, supervisors may consider that a currency is considered "significant" if the aggregate liabilities denominated in that currency amount to 5% or more of the institution's total liabilities.
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Paragraph 145 of the BCBS
Sound Principles states that "the host supervisor needs to understand how the liquidity profile of the group contributes to risks to the entity in its jurisdiction, while the home supervisor requires information on material risks a foreign branch or subsidiary poses to the banking group as a whole."
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