Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions
OSFI has prepared the following questions and answers for federally regulated financial institutions about measures it has taken to address issues stemming from COVID-19.
Have a question that is not addressed in these FAQs? Please send your question to COVID-19FAQS@osfi-bsif.gc.ca.
OSFI reduced the DSB to 1.0% of risk-weighted assets so that large banks could use this capital to make loans to Canadian businesses and households, potentially up to $300 billion.
The DSB reduction makes clear to markets that OSFI considers that measured declines in bank capital ratios are appropriate in the current circumstances and entirely consistent with the functioning of a well-capitalized and prudent institution. OSFI will monitor the use of this buffer so it can respond to further stresses, and will not increase it for at least 18 months.
OSFI will continue to assess the level of the DSB and will make adjustments as necessary. There is capacity to respond to further stresses. The exact timing and size of any release in the buffer would consider a range of factors, including an assessment of current conditions as well as forward-looking expectations around the materialization of risks to key vulnerabilities.
The decrease in the DSB was made to support banks' ability to supply credit to the economy during an expected period of disruption related to COVID-19 and related market conditions. OSFI expects that banks will use the additional lending capacity to support Canadian businesses and households.
OSFI expects that banks will use the additional lending capacity to support Canadian businesses and households during this period of stress. OSFI continues to have frequent discussions with banks and are monitoring their capital and liquidity positions as well as exposures. OSFI expects banks to be closely tracking their credit portfolios and reporting to OSFI on a regular basis on developments in those portfolios in response to the DSB release and other support programs and initiatives launched recently by the Government of Canada in response to COVID-19 and market conditions.
As announced on March 13, the DSB has been decreased by 1.25% and is now 1.00%. D-SIBs' target risk-based capital and TLAC ratios decreased by 1.25% correspondingly.
D-SIBs continue to be expected to fully meet their target TLAC requirements by November 1, 2021. The target risk-based TLAC ratio is the sum of the minimum risk-based TLAC ratio plus the DSB. Given the DSB reduction, the target risk-based TLAC ratio is now 22.5% Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA).
D-SIBs' target TLAC Leverage ratio is now 6.75%.
OSFI specified in its March 13 announcement that banks and insurers should not use this measure to increase distributions to shareholders or employees, or to undertake share buybacks.
Institutions can continue to pay regular dividends but may not increase them. To clarify, dividend increases approved before OSFI's announcement on March 13, 2020 may proceed. OSFI's announcement applies only to new dividend increases post March 13, 2020.
Institutions must immediately halt all purchases or buybacks of common shares, including buybacks previously approved by OSFI.
Institutions may continue to undertake purchases or redemptions of capital instruments other than common shares subject to the prior approval of the Superintendent and any other requirements set out in OSFI's capital guidelines. This includes non-qualifying capital instruments.
On March 13, OSFI instructed all federally regulated financial institutions that dividend increases and share buybacks should be halted for the time being. Institutions can continue to pay regular dividends but may not increase them. To clarify, already approved increases to dividends that occurred before OSFI's March 13 announcement may proceed, but that no new dividend increases can be made post March 13. OSFI will continue to monitor market conditions and the related impacts on FRFIs' financial condition. Additional measures will be considered as appropriate and necessary.
Canada's regulatory framework is strong and conservative. OSFI participates in the development of internationally-agreed upon standards pertaining to the capital requirements for banks as a member of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). These standards are then implemented by authorities within each of the member countries, taking into account differences in their respective industry, market, and legal frameworks.
The BCBS has a Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP) which monitors and assesses the adoption and implementation of its standards, while encouraging a predictable and transparent regulatory environment for internationally active banks. Canada's regulations are assessed as "Compliant" with the international standards.
OSFI continues to remain closely engaged with institutions in regards to their capital management. OSFI continues to monitor economic conditions and impacts to FRFIs and consider additional measures as appropriate.
Buffers are built-up during normal times to provide an institution with additional flexibility in times of stress like the current Covid-19 pandemic event. Pillar II capital buffers can be used to absorb unexpected losses arising from the impact of the COVID-19 disruption allowing institutions to continue to provide financial services. Deposit Taking Institutions (DTIs) that plan to use Pillar II buffers by operating below their internal capital targets should have prior discussions with their Lead Supervisor. OSFI's review of planned Pillar II buffer usage will consider whether a SMSB's expected use of the capacity is prudent, and capital conservation actions have been incorporated as appropriate.
OSFI continues to have frequent discussions with SMSBs and is monitoring their capital and liquidity positions as well as exposures. In cases where SMSBs are utilizing their capital buffers, they should use such capacity prudently and consider appropriate capital conservation actions. OSFI expects SMSBs to be closely tracking their credit portfolios and reporting on developments to OSFI on a regular basis.
A SMSB's internal target is the sum of the minimum requirements, Pillar I and Pillar II buffers. OSFI expects SMSBs to set their internal targets at levels that are adequate to support the nature and level of their risks. This includes consideration of material risks unique to an SMSB's operations, risks that are not sufficiently captured in Pillar I capital requirements and a SMSB's stress testing results. For example, a SMSB should consider its exposure to various aspects of credit risk (including concentrations), market risk, operational risk, and interest rate risk in the banking book, amongst others.
A DTI that uses its Pillar II buffers is expected to provide OSFI with a credible plan that demonstrates how and when it intends to restore its buffers. In reviewing these plans, OSFI will consider the specific circumstances of each institution.
OSFI has announced several regulatory adjustments in the context of the economic environment caused by COVID-19 over the past weeks. This includes determining that loans subject to payment deferrals will continue to be treated as performing loans under regulatory capital requirements, transitional arrangements for the capital treatment of expected credit loss provisioning, and temporary exclusions to the leverage ratio requirements. OSFI will continue to monitor market conditions in determining whether additional measures are appropriate in the current environment, however, changes in the Standardized Approach risk weights are not currently under consideration.
Payment deferrals granted during the 6 month period should not contribute to the determination of a mortgage loan as non-performing. Under normal circumstances non-performing, or past-due loans are subject to higher capital requirements than performing loans. By allowing banks to treat borrowers as performing, banks capital requirements are not required to rise due to payment deferrals. This reflects the flexibility being offered by banks to assist borrowers that are temporarily unable to service their loan during this time. After the payment deferral period ends, (up to a maximum of 6 months), the usual rules for designating a mortgage loan as non-performing would apply. A bank would designate a loan as past due if the borrower fails to meet the revised schedule of payments.
No, the capital treatment will only apply for payment deferrals for a period of up to 6 months. OSFI will revisit this treatment in the future as needed.
There is not a specific definition of mid-market commercial in the Capital Adequacy Requirements (CAR). Institutions should use their own internal definitions of this asset class, which can include commercial real estate.
For purposes of determining when a loan is past due, the institution can take into account reduced payments as well as any changes to the term of the loan, including modified payment schedules.
Delinquency should be measured on the modified schedule of payments. Customers in arrears at the end of a period of full payment deferral should continue their arrears count that existed prior to the period. Customers that were not in arrears prior the period would begin the count from zero.
For uninsured/conventional mortgages, the capital treatment described in the March 27 letter would apply. For the capital requirements, DTIs do not need to recalculate their LTVs when loan deferrals are granted. All mortgages issued at origination with LTVs below 80% would continue to be eligible for a 35% risk weight under the Standardized Approach. This treatment would also apply during mortgage renewals; however, LTVs would need to be recalculated if a mortgage is refinanced.
OSFI expects institutions to continue applying sound underwriting in all circumstances (including the likelihood of borrowers to repay when the payment deferral ends). Sound underwriting and OSFI's oversight will support continued financial resilience and stability during the current environment and thereafter.
Payment deferrals may refer to deferrals of the full interest and principal payments, or to deferrals of a portion of the payment (e.g. principal). The extent of the deferrals is at the discretion of the lender.
The treatment in the Capital Adequacy Requirements Guideline and in the March 27 letter applies to loans of Canadian institutions irrespective of the jurisdiction in which the loan is originated.
The six-month limit is the maximum number of months for which the capital treatment outlined in the March 27 letter can be applied, starting from the effective date of the loan payment deferral granted by the DTI. The actual payment deferral granted by DTIs to their borrowers can be shorter or longer than six months. These measures are effective until OSFI announces an end to the temporary capital treatment.
Covenant waivers and similar forms of relief with a direct link to the COVID-19 pandemic qualify for the same capital treatment outlined in the March 27th letter. Some examples of direct links to the pandemic include breaches caused by a temporary drop in demand, disruption in supply, or inability to perform a covenanted action. Consistent with payment deferrals, institutions are expected to continue applying sound underwriting in all circumstances.
Yes, short-term deferrals may be extended and maintain the capital treatment in the March 27th letter as long as the total duration of the deferral is no longer than 6 (calendar) months.
Yes, the capital treatment of loans outlined in the March 27th letter would equivalently apply to deferrals granted by DTIs in relation to other receivables from small business and mid-market commercial clients, including equipment leases.
The granting of a payment deferral of 6 months or less should not, in isolation, result in changes to a borrower's PD under the IRB approach. However, we expect institutions to still consider and reflect changes in other risk drivers when determining a borrower's PD, regardless of whether or not that borrower has been granted a payment deferral. Therefore, the migration of borrowers across IRB PD bands should be considered when appropriate.
Any amount included in CET1 capital should be removed from the amount included in Tier 2 capital. Please refer to this document (link) for additional guidance on the Expected Credit Loss (ECL) capital treatment.
The ECL capital treatment does not differentiate by the vintage of the loan. The scalar changes by reporting date and is applied to the increase in allowances calculated for a given quarter relative to the baseline (net of tax effects). For example, in Q1 2020, a scalar of 70% will apply against the increase in allowances taken for all loans (irrespective of vintage or origination date).
Allowances included in Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital are subtracted from allowances in Tier 2 capital. If an institution is at the above referenced limits of allowances in Tier 2 capital, the addition to CET1 capital should be offset by a reduction in Tier 2 capital, resulting in no change to the institution's total capital. However, if allowances included in CET1 capital were to exceed allowances eligible for inclusion in Tier 2 capital for an institution, that institution should report no allowances in Tier 2 capital for that quarter, but would continue to add allowances to CET1 capital. The limits on the inclusion of allowances in Tier 2 capital do not apply to the inclusion of allowances in CET1 capital under this transitional arrangement.
Institutions may choose to apply their effective corporate tax rate for the quarter, calculated as the institutions' income tax expense for the quarter divided by income before income taxes for the quarter.
As part of their Pillar 3 regulatory capital disclosure, DTIs are required to disclose the transitional scalar applied during the reporting period as well as each of the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), Tier 1 Capital, Total Capital, Leverage and Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) ratios had the transitional arrangement for expected credit loss (ECL) provisioning not been applied.
For D-SIBs and SMSBs, the following lines should be inserted in the Pillar 3 Composition of Regulatory Capital (CC1) template:
Please include the add-back to CET1 pertaining to transitional arrangements for ECL provisioning (as a positive amount) in line:
For DSIBs and SMSBs, the following lines should be inserted in the Pillar 3 Leverage Ratio Common Disclosure (LR2) template:
For D-SIBs, the following lines should be inserted in the Pillar 3 Key metrics - TLAC requirements (KM2) template:
DTIs with December 31st year-ends, should include this as part of their Q1 2020 Pillar 3 regulatory reporting. DTIs with October 31st year-ends, should include this as part of their Q2 2020 Pillar 3 regulatory reporting.
Institutions are required to calculate their market risk capital requirement by including a VaR estimate of their portfolio under both the current conditions (VaR) and under a stress period (SVaR).The intent of SVaR is to ensure that a minimum amount of capital is held against stress periods. Given the recent market volatility resulting from COVID-19, VaR has increased significantly to reach SVaR levels. OSFI's view is that, under the treatment that existed prior to its March 27 release, capital requirements were excessive and an adjustment to SVaR multipliers was deemed to be necessary.
Under the market risk framework, the minimum VaR and SVaR multiplier levels are 3. These levels are then subject to individual upward adjustments that reflect OSFI's assessment of the quality of an institution's risk management system, as well as the performance of its VaR and SVaR models. If OSFI deems there to be deficiencies, an institution's multiplier level can be increased.
OSFI will continue to monitor institutions' VaR and SVaR reports on a weekly basis and plans to remove the temporary reduction in SVaR multipliers when it deems that market conditions have returned back to normal levels.
The removal of the Funding Valuation Adjustment (FVA) hedges addresses an asymmetry that was present in the market risk rules where institutions were not permitted to include FVA sensitivities into their VaR models (since they are not market risk instruments) to offset the FVA hedges (which are market risk instruments and therefore included in the model).
FVA movements are typically hedged by institutions for accounting purposes to minimize earnings volatility. As markets become more volatile, the FVA hedges, which are not offset by the FVA sensitivities in the VaR models, result in higher capital requirements, which is not commensurate with the underlying risk.
Since the start of the pandemic, OSFI has been closely monitoring the market risk VaR breaches caused by major market movements across all risk factors (equity, interest rate, FX and commodities) and at the Total VaR level. OSFI believes the backtesting breaches for this period have largely been caused by the unexpected and elevated market volatility and may not reflect market risk modelling deficiencies.
As such, OSFI will exercise its supervisory discretion, as permitted in CAR Chapter 9 for backtesting when financial markets are subjected to a major regime shift and allow institutions subject to market risk capital requirements and using internal models to maintain the VaR multipliers they were subject to at the end of the last fiscal quarter. This means that the VaR multipliers will temporarily not be subject to automatic increases due to breach count reaching the yellow or red backtesting zones. To clarify, this is independent of the decrease in the Stressed VaR multipliers.
OSFI will continue to monitor the market volatility as well as institutions' market risk model performance. The VaR multipliers may be modified at any time based on evolving market conditions, model performance and/or other relevant factors.
Institutions are still required to maintain leverage ratios above their authorized leverage ratios at all times.
All institutions are expected to maintain a leverage ratio that meets or exceeds 3% at all times. The Superintendent can also prescribe that an institution maintain an authorized leverage ratio higher than 3%.
Once the stressed environment ends, OSFI will ensure that sufficient time is allowed for institutions to build up operating buffers above their authorized leverage ratios.
This will occur over time. Institutions will be informed of supervisory expectations through their regular ongoing discussions with their OSFI lead supervisor.
Assets that can be excluded are limited to central bank reserves (including cash held in accounts at the Bank of Canada), and securities issued by sovereigns, including sovereigns in other jurisdictions. Eligible securities should be excluded from the leverage ratio at their full on-balance sheet value (i.e., not reflecting any haircuts or limits they would be subject to under the LCR). Securities that are not issued by a sovereign, including provincial and municipal securities and securities guaranteed by sovereigns (such as CMBs and National Housing Act Mortgage-Backed Securities), are not eligible to be excluded from the leverage ratio.
For the Leverage Requirements Return, institutions should reflect their exemptions in total on-balance sheet assets (DPAs 1101 and 1108). That is, central bank reserves and sovereign issued securities should be removed from the total on-balance sheet assets. Total on-balance sheet assets will be reconciled to the accounting balance sheet via DPA 1605. Institutions should reflect the total exemptions made to the exposure measure in DPA 1101 via DPA 1605 as a negative number.
For reverse repos backed by eligible securities, only the eligible security can be excluded by the institution holding it on its balance sheet. Exclusions should be consistent with how assets are treated under the leverage ratio and any relevant accounting frameworks.
The definition of central bank reserves is meant to follow the guidance included in OSFI's LAR Guideline (i.e., Chapter 2, footnote 14). Balances that an institution has in its settlement account at the Bank of Canada should be included in the central bank reserves amount. The exclusion of central bank reserves is not limited to Canadian central bank reserves only as it is intended to cover all central bank reserves an institution holds across jurisdictions, which would also include, for example, reserves institutions hold with the US Federal Reserve.
The situation will be reassessed closer to April 30, 2021 to determine if the exclusion should be maintained longer. OSFI will ensure that sufficient time is allowed for institutions to reinstitute excluded assets into the leverage ratio exposure measure.
Assets that are excluded from the leverage ratio do not have to form part of an institution's HQLA pool (e.g. the operational requirements applied to HQLA in the LCR do not apply to the leverage ratio exclusions).
OSFI expects all institutions to exclude eligible assets from the leverage ratio in order to support consistent application across institutions and institutions' ability to supply credit to the economy.
OSFI expects that institutions will use the additional lending capacity to support Canadian businesses and households during this period of stress. OSFI continues to have frequent discussions with institutions and is monitoring their capital and liquidity positions as well as exposures. OSFI expects institutions to be closely tracking their credit portfolios and reporting to OSFI on a regular basis on the developments in those portfolios in response to the leverage ratio exclusions and other support programs and initiatives launched recently by the Government of Canada.
For the Leverage Requirements Return, institutions should reflect the exemption of these exposures in total on-balance sheet assets (DPAs 1101 and 1108). That is, exposures acquired through the MMLF and the PPPLF should be removed from the total on-balance sheet assets. Total on-balance sheet assets will be reconciled to the accounting balance sheet via DPA 1605. Institutions should reflect the total exemptions made to the exposure measure in DPA 1101 via DPA 1605 as a negative number.
For the Basel Capital Adequacy Reporting (BCAR) return, institutions should reflect the exemption of these exposures in "Total on-balance sheet assets for purposes of capital ratios" in Schedule 45. That is, exposures acquired through the MMLF and PPPLF should be removed from DPA 8924 in Schedule 45 of BCAR. Total on-balance sheet assets will be reconciled to the accounting balance sheet via DPA 8936. Institutions should reflect the total exemptions made to the exposure measure in DPA 8924 via DPA 8936 as a positive number.
This treatment will continue as long as the MMLF is operational.
Exposures acquired through participation in the PPPLF can be excluded from risk-based capital and leverage ratios.
Institutions should include all leverage ratio exclusions in the "other adjustments" line in the LR1 template of OSFI's Guideline D-12.
The extension will allow FRFIs to redeploy resources currently preparing for the next phase of the initial margin requirements to respond to the immediate impact of COVID-19. In addition, given the global nature of the derivatives market and the agreement by members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to extend the deadline for the final two phases, OSFI believes that extending the deadline will allow for a smoother and coordinated implementation of the initial margin requirements around the world.
The delay in the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB) framework is recognition of the complexity of the revised market risk framework, which was finalized later than the rest of the Basel III framework, and the required infrastructure enhancements needed to adhere to it. Regarding Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recently completed a consultation on targeted revisions to the framework. As this framework is not yet complete internationally, OSFI is delaying the domestic implementation to 2024.
No. OSFI has only delayed the implementation of the revisions to the Basel III framework finalised in December 2017. The phase-out of non-qualifying capital instruments, continues to proceed and will conclude, as scheduled, on November 1, 2021 for institutions with an October 31 fiscal year-end or January 1, 2022 for institutions with a December 31 fiscal year-end.
No. The relief measures announced by OSFI do not impact the phase-out of non-qualifying capital instruments issued by banks (or insurers). Where a bank has publicly disclosed its intent to redeem a non-qualifying instrument, that redemption would proceed subject to prior OSFI approval and standard notice requirements.
No. OSFI's announced relief measures do not include any changes to the timeline – November 1, 2021 - for Canadian D-SIBs to meet their target TLAC requirements.
Yes, the 0.7 scalar mentioned in paragraph 150 of Chapter 4 of the 2019 CAR Guideline can continue to be used by institutions until the end of the fourth fiscal quarter of 2023.
OSFI is delaying the timing for the implementation of the small and medium-sized bank (SMSB) Capital and Liquidity framework to the beginning of Q1 2023 in line with the delay in the domestic implementation of Basel III. OSFI will also delay the consultation work on Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 capital and liquidity requirements for SMSBs.
The delayed implementation of the capital and liquidity requirements for SMSBs was done to ensure continued alignment of the SMSB proportionality initiative with the timing of Basel III reforms, as well to help reduce some of the operational stress on smaller institutions. OSFI's announcement did not relate to the status of any application for a bank to use an Advanced Internal Ratings Based approach (AIRB).
The delay of the Basel III and/or proportionality initiative was incorporated to allow institutions flexibility to focus on their resilience efforts to address situations borne out of the current economic environment. The impacts of the Basel III and proportionality initiatives will vary by institution depending on the specific business model. The proportionality work is not focused on providing capital or liquidity relief to institutions, it is about ensuring that the requirements are more "fit for purpose" in the sense that risk sensitivity is improved and, where possible, complexity is reduced.
OSFI expects that institutions' pools of liquid assets to be used during a period of financial stress, even if that means an institution falls below a 100% LCR level. This is consistent with previous statements OSFI has made over time where we have encouraged institutions to use their liquidity buffers as appropriate.
The NSFR is designed as a structural measure (rather than a cash flow coverage measure) such that institutions maintain a stable funding profile in relation to the composition of their assets and off-balance sheet activities. OSFI's current expectation is that the ratio should be equal to at least 100% on an ongoing basis. Similar to the expectations related to risk-based capital ratios and the leverage ratio, OSFI encourages institutions to use operating buffers above the NSFR minimum requirement that they have generated in normal times as a source of additional flexibility in times of stress.
By using the pool of high-quality liquid assets, and thus lowering its LCR ratio, an institution is able to convert securities / market instruments into cash (through sale or repo). The institution is then able to use that cash to cover outflows, which could include generating new loans to customers.
As the Bank of Canada creates new and revises existing liquidity facilities and programs, OSFI reviews these to see how they interact with the liquidity rules. The related clarifications incorporated in OSFI's press releases (e.g. the treatment of secured funding transactions with central banks, and the treatment of the Bank of Canada's Bankers' Acceptance Purchase Facility) ensure institutions have clear guidance on how those facilities and programs are expected to be treated in OSFI's liquidity framework.
Generally, institutions do not need to include outflows in the LCR for retail and small business term deposits if the remaining term is greater than 30 days (i.e. is outside the LCR horizon). However, if an institution allows withdraws without applying a penalty, or despite a clause that says the depositor has no legal right to withdraw, the entire category of term deposits should be treated as demand deposits and be subject to an LCR outflow. The exception is where there are exceptional circumstances that would qualify as hardship (i.e. pre-defined and documented situations such as death, catastrophic illness, loss of employment, or bankruptcy of the depositor). OSFI is extending the definition of hardship to cover situations that align with existing guidance to ensure institutions can support their retail and small business customers' current needs without being penalized within their regulatory liquidity metrics.
Part of the guidance reiterates an expectation that institutions can apply lower Required Stable Funding (RSF) factors to assets that are pledged to the central bank in times of stress. In addition, OSFI has incorporated a maximum RSF factor of 50% for these transactions. In practice, this temporary treatment increases incentives for institutions to utilize the Bank of Canada's term secured financing facilities as the funding requirement on the assets pledged is more in line with the funding credit institutions receive. This is particularly the case for the expanded set of collateral types that the Bank of Canada has incorporated (e.g. own-issued covered bonds, own-issued CP, etc.). This remains in line with underlying incentives in the NSFR framework that institutions look to term out their funding sources.
Yes, institutions conducting term repo operations with the domestic central bank of their subsidiaries can receive the same Required Stable Funding (RSF) factor for the assets pledged that is applied to an equivalent asset that is unencumbered, including application of the 50% RSF cap.
Yes, during the period of a loan payment deferral, institutions should continue to treat such loans as performing and categorize these loans accordingly within the NSFR (based on counterparty type, term to maturity, etc.).
Institutions should exclude the amount of BAs sold into the BAPF from the LCR return (i.e. these should not be reported in DPA 21230 given the weight of 1.00 assigned to that DPA). These amounts should instead be tracked separately and be available to be reported to OSFI upon request. Maturing BAs that are not utilized as part of the BAPF should continue to be reported in DPA 21230 (weighted at 1.00) within the LCR return. Similar to the LCR return, BAs sold into the BAPF should be excluded from the NCCF return.
The liability related to borrowing from the STLF should be recorded in DPA 131330. The unweighted amount of assets pledged should be reported in their respective categories (rows) and maturity columns ("Amount"). The weighted amount related to these assets should reflect the 50% RSF cap in the "Calculated RSF" columns, where applicable. Validation rules on the NSFR return will be temporary disabled or overridden to allow for the 50% RSF cap treatment.
The liability related to borrowing from term repo operations with central banks should be recorded in DPA 131330, DPA 151330, and DPA 171330 for terms of less than 6 months, between 6 months and less than one year, and greater than 1 year, respectively. The unweighted amount of assets pledged should be reported in their respective categories (rows) and maturity columns ("Amount"). The weighted amount related to these assets should reflect the 50% RSF cap in the "Calculated RSF" columns, where applicable. Validation rules on the NSFR return will be temporary disabled or overridden to allow for the 50% RSF cap treatment.
The NSFR treatment outlined in OSFI's March 27 letter is not only limited to operations with the Bank of Canada. Assets pledged to obtain funding from exceptional liquidity facilities or programs extended by the Government of Canada in response to the COVID-19 crisis can also be assigned the RSF of an asset that is unencumbered. At this time, this flexibility can be extended to the Insured Mortgages Purchase Program (IMPP) administered by CMHC.
The NHA MBS sold into the IMPP program should be reported in DPAs 133240, 153240, or 173240 (i.e. RSF factor as "unencumbered") based on the remaining maturity of the security. The corresponding liability should be recorded as funding from a Sovereign, in DPAs 131340, 151340, or 171340, based on the remaining maturity of the liability.
Assets pledged to the Bank of Canada for exceptional liquidity operations should be assigned the RSF factor of an asset that is unencumbered, up to a maximum RSF of 50%. For own-issued covered bonds pledged to the Bank of Canada, institutions should report the related mortgage assets in the underlying covered bond pool in the NSFR, and assign them a 50% RSF factor. Any remaining mortgage assets supporting covered bonds that are not pledged to the Bank of Canada will continue to attract the RSF for mortgages under the current OSFI NSFR rules (i.e. not capped at 50% RSF).
Consistent with the leverage ratio and risk-based capital treatments, loans through the Canada Emergency Business Account (CEBA) program and their corresponding liabilities can be excluded from institutions' NSFRs.
The amounts institutions receive from these funding facilities and the assets used to secure such funding should be excluded from the calculation of an institution's total net cash outflow amount in the LCR and NCCF, and also be excluded from the NSFR computation.
No. The delay in the implementation date of revisions to Guideline B-12 for SMSBs was incorporated to allow institutions to focus on their resilience efforts to address situations borne out of the current economic environment. OSFI already has sound risk management principles associated with IRRBB, that are articulated in the current Guideline B-12, and which will remain in place for SMSBs until the revised January 2022 implementation date of Guideline B-12.
During the current period of market-wide stress, increasing the limit is important to help provide banks additional capacity to access a stable source of funding through the Bank of Canada. The 10% level provides each issuer a substantial additional amount of capacity while remaining prudent. The calibration of the limit also incorporates the potential for changes in overcollateralization during times of stress. OSFI is of the view that the 5.5% limit for issuances to the market remains appropriate.
Although the aggregate limit of total assets pledged for covered bonds has increased temporarily to 10%, the 5.5% limit continues to apply to covered bonds issued to the market and institutions are expected to continue to manage this limit accordingly. OSFI expects that covered bonds levels will return below this threshold when market funding conditions permit, and that institutions will provide a plan to OSFI outlining their proposed approach and timing to return below the required threshold. Once markets have stabilized, registered covered bond issuers could replace amounts that had been temporarily funded by covered bonds sold to the Bank of Canada though other funding instruments, such as senior unsecured bonds or deposits. Registered covered bond issuers could also sell covered bonds to the market to the extent that the issuer has room available within the 5.5% limit. OSFI and the Bank of Canada will closely monitor registered covered bond issuers' utilization of Bank of Canada liquidity facilities with the goal of supporting a smooth transition away from these extraordinary funding sources.
The 10% limit applies to all outstanding covered bonds; this includes self-issued covered bonds used as collateral in repo transactions with the Bank of Canada and those that are not. If a covered bond was previously used as collateral, but is no longer used in such manner, assets pledged for this covered bond will continue to be measured against the 10% limit as long as the covered bond is outstanding.
No, there are no regulatory measures specifically targeted to foreign bank branches. FBBs are encouraged to reach out to their lead supervisor should they have any questions about their operations or OSFI requirements in light of the current environment.
OSFI and Bank of Canada make updates to the requirements of the exercise periodically in the normal course of running this program; however, these planned enhancements can be deferred without negatively affecting the program. The enhancements are mainly related to gathering incrementally more data in certain specific areas, such as across Provisions for Credit Losses (PCL), RWA and revenue projections, but as the program already collects significant information in these areas, deferring these enhancements was a reasonable step to take and will not reduce the effectiveness of the program.
Consistent with the March 30th letter, under the BDC co-lending program only the DTI's 20% portion is considered an exposure to the borrower. This same exposure would apply for the purpose of the $1.25 million threshold under the standardized approach to credit risk (as set out in paragraph 25 of Chapter 3 of the 2019 Capital Adequacy Requirements (CAR) Guideline) and under the internal ratings based approach (as set out in paragraph 29 of Chapter 6 of the 2019 CAR Guideline).
Employee compensation was referring to the total compensation packages for senior management, where significant portions are often tied to performance bonuses. This expectation was not intended to be applied to the entire institution.